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Abstract How to make sense of a popular vote is a question raised 
once again by the prospect of a Brexit referendum. To date the 
French rejection of the European Union constitutional treaty’s 
ratiﬁcation has been one of the most consequential electoral 
statements in the history of European integration. Still, what its 
actual message was con- tinues to puzzle analysts. What were the 
French telling us? The article approaches this question of from the 
angle of the discursive processes of meaning making in the public 
sphere, through arguments, narratives and images. Complementing 
available explanatory accounts based on survey date or quantitative 
textual analysis, it presents a non-quantitative interpretive discourse 
analysis of political ideas providing structures of meaning in the 
debate around the treaty, as it was reﬂected in the press. The focus is 
on discursive and narrative techniques of meaning making and 
knowledge production. These are situated against embedding webs 
of beliefs, languages, and traditions. The reading offered pre- sents 
the debate as structured (i) by the motif of an open-ended search for a 
better Europe, rather than an outright rejection of the integration 
project (ii) by a deep opposition between ‘social Europe’ and a world 
where political agency over market forces is lost, and (iii) by an 
overarching discourse about reclaiming this agency, popular 
sovereignty, and asserting the will to inﬂuence Europe’s political 
future. 
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Introduction 
 
On 29 May 2005, the French electorate rejected the ratiﬁcation of the EU con- 
stitutional treaty (TCE) by 55 per cent (turnout 69 per cent). Three days later the Dutch 
followed suit. And for the ﬁrst time in the history of European integration popular 
verdicts in referendums brought a treaty to the fall. ‘The tragedy’, philo- sopher Tully 
(2007) noted about the EU-constitution referendums, ‘is that we do not even know why 
peoples voted “no”’ (p. 77). If referendums, and elections more broadly, can carry 
dramatic messages, it is difﬁcult to read these messages. As for voting behaviour more 
broadly, there is a certain mystery over what a particular vote choice means to its 
author, what they intend to express by it. Proponents of the notion of  an  electoral  
mandate  are  all  too  familiar  with the problem of discovering the meaning of a vote, 
or ‘what voters wishes are’ (Kelley, 1983, p. 134, see Dahl, 1990, pp. 362–366; for  a  
study of  how  the  news media  helped  construct  election  mandates  in  six  Canadian  
elections, see Mendelsohn, 1998). 
This article revisits the 2005 French referendum, more particularly, the wider 
public debate surrounding  it  and  the  campaign  as  reﬂected  in  the  (print)  media.      
It presents a case for, and an example of, a qualitative interpretive reading of processes of 
collective meaning making and knowledge production at play in referendum debates. 
Whereas much progress has been made in reﬁning causal explanations of the referendum 
result we know much less about what the French may have meant to say with their votes. 
Of course, as Berezin (2009) puts it, the ‘French “non” meant “no” to the draft treaty but 
it also had multiple other meanings’ (p. 193). In order to reveal these manifold and 
complex other meanings, this article proposes a perspective complemen- tary to existing 
explanatory accounts. It suggests thinking of popular votes in referendums as 
performative acts that produce, carry, and convey certain implicit and explicit meanings. 
Votes thus understood as performances are approached as some- thing to be interpreted 
rather than outcomes to be explained in a counterfactual (see Berezin, 2012, p. 616). 
The article’s speciﬁc focus is on the ‘stage’ of the ideas and understandings shaping, 
and shaped by, the French referendum debate as it was reﬂected in the quality press. 
The article is divided into two main parts. The ﬁrst section explains the adopted 
research design and  underlying methodological choices, and  situates the article’s 
reading in the context of existing explanations of the French vote.  The subsequent 
presentation of the case material in the Section ‘Interpreting meaning-making in 
dialogue with existing why-explanations’ opens with a number of observations on 
general discursive patterns that characterised the French debate. This is followed by a 
discussion of the central discursive opposition running through the debate, between a 
‘social Europe’, associated with all kinds of respective ideals of a better world, and a 
‘liberal Europe’, feared and antagonised by both camps. A ﬁnal subsection addresses 
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the role played in the debate by the issue of ‘democracy’ as well as, through this lens, 
Eastern enlargement and Turkish accession. The Conclusion relates the article’s 
interpretive explorations of meaning making to existing accounts of voting behaviour 
and political attitudes in the EU. 
 
 
Interpreting Meaning-Making in Dialogue with Existing Why-
Explanations 
  
A substantial literature investigates why the French voted the way they did, and 
what motivates voting behaviour in referendums more broadly. Despite all 
disagreements, a common narrative emerges from this literature, which is distilled 
below. In direct dialogue with it, this section raises a  number  of  questions  that  arise  
from  it, and explains how the article’s interpretive qualitative perspective and research 
design might shed light on them. These questions provide a loose structure for the 
subsequent presentation of the case material. 
The referendum debate and dramatis personae 
Four levels of independent variables in particular tend to be considered by the 
literature explaining the referendum outcome: domestic politics, and especially party 
politics or government-opposition dynamics (for example, Crum, 2007); the referendum 
campaign (Atikcan, forthcoming; Hobolt, 2009); the media coverage of the campaign 
and the constitutional treaty itself (Maatsch, 2007; see Statham and Trenz, 2012); and, 
ﬁnally, the level of the voters, including their socio-economic and geographic 
backgrounds, political attitudes and issue positions, or information levels (Bailey, 2008; 
Glencross and Trechsel, 2011). Most accounts analyse a combination of these levels, 
and how they interacted (in addition to the above, see for example, Hainsworth, 2006; 
Ivaldi, 2006; Crespy, 2008; Hobolt and Brouard, 2011). Many lay special emphasis on 
cue-taking effects (of voters following ‘cues’ from political parties, individual 
politicians, other campaign actors, the media and so on), priming effects (of actors 
‘priming’ issues, or making them seem relevant to the vote choice), and framing effects 
(of their ‘framing’ the question at stake in certain ways, deﬁning what in this case the 
constitutional treaty was about, how it should be understood, and what should be done 
about it; see Hobolt, 2009; Hobolt and Brouard, 2011; Statham and Trenz, 2012, p. 142; 
Atikcan, forthcoming). All of these effects worked crucially through the campaign and 
the debate around the referendum. 
The present article shares, with much of this work, the understanding that 
contributors to the debate (including parties, individual politicians, civil society 
organisations or activists, journalists or other commentators and individual citizens) 
engaged in ‘discursive entrepreneurship’ (see Fligstein, 2001). Promoting certain issues 
or frames over others, opponents of ratiﬁcation in particular used the ratiﬁcation 
controversy strategically to gain ‘credibility and momentum from the referendum’ 
(Marthaler, 2005, p. 236). Laurent Fabius, for example, reneged his Parti Socialiste’s 
(PS) pro-ratiﬁcation stance, agreed by internal referendum in December 2004. He did so 
in the context of a leadership contest within the socialist party, and not least with a view 
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to who would be the left’s main candidate for the 2007 presidential election (see 
Hainsworth, 2006, p. 101; Crespy, 2008; Grossmann and Woll, 2011). As Fabius, 
contributors to the debate sought to empower or (re-) constitute themselves as legitimate 
actors through their speech acts (Seidendorf, 2010), and/or tried to anchor certain issues 
or discourses more ﬁrmly in the discursive and political landscape. Especially the anti-
globalisation group ATTAC, founded in 1998, had a golden moment in the limelight as 
a key contributor to the No campaign, relating the constitution to anti-globalisation 
sentiments and discourses, now catapulted to the very forefront of national debate. 
Key protagonists in the spectacle of the campaign thus included, on the side of 
the No, renegade factions of the ofﬁcially pro-ratiﬁcation PS and Greens, as well as  the 
parties to the left of the PS, and civil society organisations such ATTAC, the Fondation 
Copernic, or trade unions.1 Prominent treaty opponents on the right, in turn, comprised 
notably Nicolas Dupont-Aignan (Union pour un Mouvement Populaire, UMP), the 
traditionalist Eurosceptic Philippe de Villiers (Mouvement pour la France, MPF), as 
well as, on the extreme right,  Jean-Marie  Le  Pen  (Front National, FN) – who, 
however, stayed relatively quiet throughout the debate, presumably so as not to discredit 
the No vote (Ivaldi, 2006, pp. 55–56; Berezin, 2009; Atikcan forthcoming, pp. 94–95; 
see for example, Libération 23 March 2005). The chorus of the Yes campaign, in turn, 
comprised the governing centre-right UMP and its Giscardist junior party Union pour la 
Démocratie Française (UDF, led by François Bayrou), in addition to the PS and Green 
majorities. 
The referendum campaign and its media coverage are established independent 
variables in research explaining the voting outcome. They played an important role, 
more speciﬁcally, in priming certain existing attitudes as relevant to the referendum 
choice, and in framing the constitution as pertinent to speciﬁc issue attitudes, according 
to research focusing on their inﬂuence on public opinion (Hobolt, 2009; Hobolt and 
Brouard, 2011, respectively). It was notably the No camp that had the upper hand in 
deﬁning the terms and grounds of the debate (for example, Marthaler, 2005; Mergier, 
2005, p. 22). Ratiﬁcation opponents ‘were more successful in initiating public debate 
and in deﬁning the meaning’ of the constitutional treaty than its proponents, a 
quantitative discourse analysis of the campaign’s newspaper coverage has found 
(Maatsch, 2007, p. 261). A seminal comparison of all four 2005 TCE referendum 
campaigns, moreover, which brings together in-depth interviews with campaigners, 
media content analyses, and public opinion data, makes a direct causal connection 
between the No campaigners effective framing of the constitution and the dramatic fall 
of the initially favourable public opinion on it (Atikcan, forthcoming, p. 6). 
The debate and its reﬂection in the press as a stage for meaning-making 
If the debate and campaign did inﬂuence voting behaviour and public opinion, 
this paper is an experiment in how interpretive analysis can help to break up the black 
box and knowledge production in the debate. These processes shaped, and reﬂected, 
how people made sense of the constitution, making certain understandings become 
more plausible than others (see also Seidendorf, 2010; Sternberg, 2013). More 
particularly, the article looks at discourses (ways of representing the world through 
words) used by the two camps. These discourses are understood to be expressive as well 
as constitutive of collective meanings. The article unpacks such ‘meanings as beliefs’ 
(Bevir, 2006, p. 281, 83), and the narratives, imageries, and discursive techniques 
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employed by the two camps, situating them in the wider webs of embedding meanings, 
languages, and discursive traditions. In a nutshell, it provides an analysis of 
contemporary French political ideas. 
The underlying thus approach differs essentially from ‘critical discourse 
analysis’. This is because discourses are approached not as independent variables that 
explain political outcomes (see Hay, 2004; Bailey, 2008, p. 35), but rather in their own 
right, as dialectically related to the ‘meanings, belief systems and preferences’ that 
underlie people’s actions (Bevir and Rhodes, 2003, p. 1). The article’s source work is 
‘interpretive’ in the sense of being ‘concerned, empirically, with meaning’ (Yanow and 
Schwartz-Shea, 2006, p. xii). ‘Humans making meaning out of the meaning- making of 
other humans’ is the activity at the heart of the interpretive approach. This makes it 
inescapably subjective, as well as non-positivist (Pachirat, 2006, p. 374). 
The referendum debate and campaign are conceptualised here as a stage for the 
production and contestation of meaning. Of course, individual meanings attributed to 
these performances varied greatly. Still, they were structured and enabled, by their 
context. Shared, inter-subjective meanings – and the campaign messages that would be 
received given these shared meanings – were produced, contested, adapted and revealed 
in the debates surrounding the referendum and constitution. These debates shaped and 
reﬂected the (ever changing) available common language; the vocabu- lary, semantics, 
and imagery that made meaningful communication possible. Discursive actors were 
both constrained by this structure, and agents over it (Wendt, 1987, see Seidendorf, 
2010, p. 426). Hence, the discourses discussed below represented, in part, novel 
discursive shifts, but were also vehicles of already ongoing discursive developments 
and deeply grounded in longstanding discursive and French political traditions (see for 
example, Hazareesingh, 1994; Sternberg, 2013). 
Relevant meaning making and knowledge-producing processes took place 
across the private and public spheres. This included, but was not limited to, the media. 
Still, the textual corpus analysed for this article was selected from the national quality 
press, and more particularly Le Monde, Le Figaro, and Libération. This is because the 
media overall, and these dailies in particular, are assumed to have been central 
mediators between ‘private public’ debate and the organised campaign, making their 
respective arguments and understandings, and feedbacks between them, visible to each 
other. Contributions to the campaign and to public debate became relevant not least by 
their resonance in them (see similarly Statham and Trenz, 2012, p. 174, 184). Gamson 
(1992), furthermore, has helpfully compared media discourses with ‘maps’ that guide 
ordinary citizens through the ‘forest’ of an issue in public affairs, where people may 
choose to stick to the pathways provided or wander off on their own account (p. 117).2 
To stay in Gamson’s image, the article explores the discursive repertoire of arguments, 
ideas, narratives – the maps – available to help the French ﬁnd their way through the 
wood of the EU constitution, as well as the surrounding topographies of languages, 
imageries, and broader discursive contexts or cognitive conditions. 
The article’s limitation to the press, and speciﬁcally the quality press, is 
admittedly problematic. Notable omissions include the newly emerging free commuter 
dailies Metro and 20 min. The latter was in the process of a spectacular rise to being the 
second most-read paper after Le Monde (Le Nouvel Observateur 9 June 2005). 
Moreover, new online media are, and were, ‘commonly accepted’ to be playing an 
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important role in this particular debate (see Marthaler, 2005, p. 233; Fouetillou, 2006; 
Seidendorf, 2010, p. 428). For this very reason, however, the traditional print media 
devoted exceptional attention to the arguments advanced in the papers distributed free 
of charge, as well as in Internet chats, forums, and blogs, in addition to the broadcast 
media. The referendum debate was an exceptional moment where previously more 
marginal discourses challenged and established themselves ﬁrmly in the discursive 
mainstream, not least in the selected dailies (see Fouetillou, 2006; Seidendorf, 2010, p. 
428). The quality press covered this development in a reﬂexive way. In addition, their 
coverage was ‘used in deciding what stories should be covered by television news’, and 
probably the new free and online media as well (Picard, 2015, p. 15, on the campaign’s 
TV coverage generally, see Gerstlé, 2006). On these grounds, the selected corpus does 
arguably give a reasonably good picture of the discursive landscape of the wider public 
debate at large. 
The corpus analysed covers the 3 months leading up to the referendum on 29 
May 2005. In this period public opinion shifted from 60 per cent in favour to 54 per 
cent against (Ipsos, 2005). A total of 897 articles were reviewed: 306 for the centre-left 
Le Monde (M), 456 for the centre-right Le Figaro (F, both retrieved on LexisNexis, 
keywords ‘constitution européenne’ AND ‘référendum’), and 135 opinion pieces for the 
left-of-centre Libération (L, retrieved from liberation fr, same keywords for the debate 
rubric ‘rebonds’). Key discursive positions and techniques were identiﬁed by reading 
and re-reading this comprehensive sample. This iterative ‘hermeneutic circle’, 
moreover, extensively drew further on ﬁeldwork conducted by the author in Paris from 
September 2004 to June 2005. This involved regularly reviewing 20 min, online sources 
(selected by the snowball principle), the many books on the constitution displayed in 
bookshops, as well as campaign posters and pamphlets distributed at metro stops and 
markets, in addition to reading a mixture of daily and weekly papers, watching 
television, attending talks by a number of key campaign players at Sciences Po, and 
having conversations on the constitution on a daily basis (according to a widely reported 
IFOP poll, the referendum featured in 83 per cent ‘of conversations’ in May; cited in 
Ricard-Nihoul, 2005,  p.  3).  On  a  second  level, particular texts and passages 
exemplary of the thus extracted key discursive moves were subjected to close readings, 
much like a scholar of literature would approach a set of poems or short stories. How, 
and on what grounds, do they   create and contest meaning? The analytical focus lay on 
recurrent or especially effective story lines, arguments, imageries, and rhetorical 
techniques. These were contextualised, further, in  the  embedding  webs  of  
understandings,  meanings, and beliefs. Particular emphasis is placed on the use of 
binary oppositions, as discussed below. 
The method applied, thus, is essentially qualitative. This choice sets this article 
apart from most of the existing literature on the French vote, campaign, and debate – 
which draws overwhelmingly on large-n survey data and/or quantitative frame or 
discourse analyses (see notably Seidendorf, 2010 for an exception). Most accounts that 
consider ideas, discourses, or frames basically measure or compare which actors used 
which frames how often (for example, Lord, 2008), and to what effects on public 
opinion and voting behaviour (for example, Maatsch, 2007; Hobolt, 2009). Atikcan’s 
analysis stands out in that her main explanatory factor for the shift in public opinion is 
the ‘relative strength’ of the No campaign’s framing. Strong arguments for the No, she 
suggests, were those that ‘built a connection between existing contentious issues’ and 
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the referendum proposal (12–13), and did so in a timely manner, before the Yes 
campaign got into gear. Drawing on pertinent political- framing literatures, Atikcan 
(forthcoming) identiﬁes strong frames as those related to beliefs stored in people’s 
memory, as vivid, concrete, image provoking and emotionally compelling, and as 
resting on ‘negative easy versus positive hard arguments’ (pp. 19–28; see also Hobolt, 
2009, p. 20, 110–133; see below). She,  too, uses quantitative media content analysis in 
order to ‘observe the extent to which the campaign messages were picked up by the 
news media’, and to quantify their impact (forthcoming, p. 29) – and to work back from 
their thus identiﬁed strength to a theory explaining it. 
There is an inevitable trade-off between translating textual data into numerical, 
measurable and comparable indices on the one hand and, on the other, capturing deeper 
argumentative and narrative dynamics of discursive construction, or implicit and 
context-dependent meanings that would slip through the net of indicator-based research 
(see Yanow and Schwartz-Shea, 2006, p. xii). This article’s methodology and research 
design prioritise the second option. This means that it does not undertake to, and cannot, 
make claims about the relative frequency or dominance of the discourses and discursive 
techniques it discusses. Rather, it starts from a number of themes identiﬁed as central by 
others, to then zoom in on the underlying narrative and argumentative workings and the 
embedding discursive context in the next few sections. In the picture portrayed  by the 
available quantitative work, the main fault lines of the debate and vote ran as follows. 
The mainstream narrative and its loose ends 
A prominent explanation of the French vote is that it was at least in part a 
‘sanction vote’ against President Jacques Chirac and the centre-right government 
(Dehousse, 2006, pp. 152–153, see Hainsworth, 2006, Ivaldi, 2006). Broken up by 
political afﬁliation, however, opposition to Chirac was important  in  explaining  the  
No vote among his opponents, and more speciﬁcally among right-wing and neither- left-
nor-right factions, but not among the leftist voters (Brouard and Tiberj, 2006, p. 266) – 
where the No vote was much stronger than on the right (Marthaler, 2005; Atikcan, 
forthcoming, pp. 123–124). Many commentators located  the  ‘chief  cause’ of the 
French No vote, on this basis, in the division of the PS (Crum, 2007, pp. 76–77). 
Against such explanations centred on domestic politics – and mirroring the 
debate on whether or not EU votes are really ‘second-order national elections’ (see 
Crum, 2007, pp. 63–64 for an overview) – a number of survey-based studies have 
concluded that the vote was indeed ‘about Europe’, or EU-related issues. Some see a 
general ‘rejection of the European project’ at play (Brouard and Sauger, 2005, p. 140), 
or how ‘voters understood the EU polity, in particular whether membership is beneﬁcial 
to one’s own country’ (Glencross and Trechsel, 2011). Others provide evidence that 
vote choices were ‘driven by speciﬁc issue concerns rather than general dissatisfaction 
with the European Union or national governments’ (see Hobolt, 2009, pp. 226–227; 
Hobolt and Brouard, 2011, p. 309). From this vantage point, the No vote was not a vote 
against Europe as such. One of the questions addressed in this article is in what the 
French debate actually turned on a rejection of the EU as a whole, or of integration as 
such. 
What virtually all accounts do agree on, moreover, is the crucial importance of 
the economic and social situation in France, and the constitution’s implications for it. 
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TCE opponents on the left feared the ‘neo-liberalisation’ of the EU’s and France’s 
economic and social model, and those on the right, the social and economic 
consequences of open borders and free-trade liberalism (Ivaldi, 2006, p. 61). Economic 
and social issues were central as a frame in the campaign (Atikcan, forthcoming), as 
well as in the media coverage (Maatsch, 2007; Hobolt, 2009,     pp. 209–210, 226; on 
the TV coverage, see Gerstlé, 2006 or Piar and Gerstlé, 2005). In addition, they were 
the single most central consideration in people’s vote choices (see Brouard and Sauger, 
2005; Ivaldi, 2006; Hobolt, 2009, p. 224, 215; Atikcan, forthcoming, pp. 120–122), 
even if they played a much more ‘marginal’ role among voters on the right (Brouard 
and Tiberj, 2006, pp. 266–267). This article explores, on this basis, discursive meaning-
making dynamics by which the constitution could so plausibly be framed as a matter of 
social and economic questions. 
The other most controversial issue in the print media (Maatsch, 2007, but 
Hobolt, 2009, pp. 209–210) and campaign (see Atikcan, forthcoming, p. 102, 4), as well 
as the most decisive issue at least for UMP and FN supporters who voted No, was the 
issue of Turkish accession (see Brouard and Sauger, 2005, pp. 132–134, Atikcan,  
forthcoming,  pp.  122–123).  Notwithstanding,  overall  the  question     of Turkish 
membership (9 per cent) was given much less frequently as a reason    for voting No 
than negative consequences for France’s social model (57 per cent), too liberal/not 
social enough (37 per cent), opposition to government (18 per cent), according  to  Flash  
Eurobarometer  (Nrs  171  and  172,  2005;  see  Hobolt, 2009, p. 215). 
Finally, there is striking disagreement in the literature on the salience of 
‘democracy’ as an issue of debate. Hobolt (2009, p. 210) does not list democracy as one 
of the main issues of debate, whereas Maatsch does have it as a prominent justiﬁcation 
given for discursive actors’ positions on the constitution (2007, pp. 272–273). It seems 
comparably uncontroversial, however, that ‘democracy’, or a lack thereof, was not an 
important voting motivation. Only 3 per cent of Flash Eurobarometer respondents 
spontaneously mentioned a lack of democracy as a reason for their having voted No (Nr 
171, 2005, p. 17). Was democracy really so absent from the debate, or did it make an 
entry in disguise? What follows takes up all these questions. 
 
The Plot as Seen from the Interpretivist Seats 
 
A key to understanding the debate as a whole was the following pattern. 
Advocates of ratiﬁcation, at least initially, focused on making a  case for how  the 
constitution would improve the status quo. The EU, and France, they repeated, would 
be better off  if  the  constitution were  ratiﬁed  (for  example, F 10/05). They 
showcased the treaty’s institutional improvements (including revised decision-making 
procedures, which would not only allow the enlarged 25-member EU  to  function 
better, but also  increase France’s voting weight),  its advances towards democracy and 
transparency, or the fundamental rights charter (see also  Atikcan,  forthcoming,  p.  
108).  The  ‘advocates  of  the  No’ by contrast pilloried the gap between the Europe of 
the constitution and their ideal of a better Europe. Effectively they redeﬁned the 
question at stake. The ofﬁcial referendum question read ‘Do you approve the bill 
authorising the ratiﬁcation of the treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe?’ The 
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constitu- tion’s opponents, however, forcefully asserted that the ‘real  question’  being 
asked of the French was ‘Which Europe do we want?’ (for example, F 07/03/ 2005, 
07/04/2005; M 14/05/2005; L 26 May 2005, 17 March 2005; see the title of Le 
Figaro’s opinion-piece series on the constitutional treaty of that name, and Milner, 
2006, p. 257 on the Communist referendum manifesto). This discursive move was so 
successful that ratiﬁcation advocates, too, had no choice but to turn their attention to 
the ‘real’ question, thus unwillingly fuelling a dynamic that ultimately worked against 
the constitution. 
Which Europe do we want? Or: What are we actually talking about? 
To begin with, the redeﬁnition of the question under discussion effectively 
moved the measuring stick for assessing the constitution away from the status quo with 
all its shortcomings, and shifted it to an ill-deﬁned ideal open to manifold 
interpretations. This had the advantage of taking all those on board who generally 
approved of European integration. According to Eurobarometer, 88 per cent considered 
France’s membership ‘a good thing’ immediately after the referendum (Flash 171, June 
2005:23). Some public opinion scholars, however, have presented more sceptical views 
and statistics (for example, Ivaldi, 2006, p. 59, or Dehousse, 2006, p. 154; Sauger et al, 
2007, pp. 16–23). At the discursive level, to be sure, one journalist commented, 
everybody ‘vied with each other in their faith in Europe’, even among the critics of the 
constitution, (L 24 May 2005a, see also Maatsch, 2007, p. 271). Framing the debate in 
terms of a quest for a better world, permitted regarding obstructing the constitution’s 
ratiﬁcation as a positive act of ‘hope’ (for example, cultural critic Slavoj Žižek in  M  26  
May  2005b  or  the  Communist  pamphlet ‘Le NON: un vote d’espoir’). 
Voting No became a statement not a statement against Europe, but in favour of a 
different, a better Europe. According to a common metaphor, a French No would entail 
a ‘salutary crisis’ (for example, M 24 May 2005b, L 23 March 2005a, 16 September 
2004; see contra, M 31 March 2005, 14 April 2005). What this crisis would entail, 
ranged from a ‘more leftist’ treaty extracted by the ‘vast European movement arising 
from a French No’ (Duhamel, 2005, p. 14, L 23 March 2005a) to a ‘Europe founded on 
sovereignty and the free cooperation of states’ (F 25 March 2005). 
Such constructive readings of a no vote were favoured by the general confusion 
about whether or not the constitution would be renegotiated if rejected. This 
bewilderment found an emblem in the soon infamous ‘plan B’, over the existence  of 
which there was much disagreement and speculation. Proponents of the No, and most 
prominently Fabius (for example, M 7 May 2005), successfully kindled the hope of 
crafting a better Europe, and France, by detailing demands regarding what France’s 
positions should be. Against such utopias made tangible by projection, ratiﬁcation 
proponents were reduced to repeating, on a daily basis, that there would be no 
opportunity to renegotiate, there was ‘no such thing as a plan B’. 
The redeﬁnition of the question opened up discursive space for a critical 
engagement with what was perceived to be wrong, not only with the proposed treaty, 
but also with the EU. As anything was conceivable at this moment of public 
imagination of ideal alternatives, there was a lot to take fault with. ‘Each of us has a 
reason to say no’ as de Villiers canvassed (M 24 May 2005a). The constitution’s 
opponents partly objected to speciﬁc treaty provisions, giving some rather twisted 
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interpretations. Communist party leader Marie-George Buffet for instance intimated that 
the treaty would abolish the rights to abortion and divorce (M 20 April 2005b). Others  
claimed  it  would  re-establish  the  death  penalty,  undermine  the  secular 
principle of ‘laïcité’ (and hence the very nature of the French republic), or lead 
to the dismantling of French public utilities (‘services publics’; for example, M 15 June 
2005, 8 March 2005, 20 March 2004, L 17 March 2005a). These allegations allowed the 
No camp to fashion themselves as the defenders of constitutive French political 
traditions such as the enlightenment tradition, universalism, and étatism (see 
Hazareesingh, 1994, pp. 151–178; Maatsch, 2007, p. 276; Seidendorf, 2010). Moreover, 
they could also be read as examples of a deliberate ‘bullshit strategy’ (see Frankfurt, 
2005; Fossum and Trenz, 2006, p. 16), or of actors strategically presenting a particular 
interpretation of the issue instead of ‘providing voters with facts’ (Atikcan, 
forthcoming, p. 11). 
Ratiﬁcation advocates unsurprisingly accused opponents of lying and wilfully 
stoking confusion (see for example, L 17 March 2005a, M 27 April 2005, F 10 May 
2005). They threw themselves into the ‘educational challenge’ of illuminating what the 
provisions really would entail (for example, M 2 March 2005b, 6 March 2005,  7 April 
2005), and engaged with the prominent concerns one by one: the ‘freedom of thought, 
conscience, and religion’, they explained, did not entail an attack on French secularism; 
the ‘right to life’ was not an abortion ban; and ‘services publics’ were referred to as 
‘services of general economic interest’ and actually protected for the ﬁrst time (M 28 
May 2005, see also 8 March 2005, 20 March 2004, 29 May 2005). The Yes camp 
effectively found themselves coerced thus to counter the No-side’s individual 
allegations. This attested to the success of the No camp’s framing, a pattern conﬁrmed 
by campaigners on both sides ex post facto (Atikcan, forthcoming, 
p. 101). The No camp retorted, moreover, by denouncing in turn the Yes 
campaign’s ‘policy of lies’, and  their  ‘educational’  approach  as  patronising  (for  
example,  M 5 May 2005, 26 May 2005c, or Le Pen in F 11 May 2005). 
In this standoff of mutual accusations and contradictions as to what the text 
entailed, one person’s word stood against another’s. Everyone on the electoral register 
had been mailed a copy of the constitutional text and many had a go at it. Most citizens 
were at a loss as to what it really would imply. The debate turned into a paradigm 
example of how context becomes more important than legal text when this legal test is 
read by non-experts, and even more so in a debate as highly mediatised as this one (see 
Fossum and Trenz, 2006, p. 12). Beyond the actual, confusing text of the treaty, the 
balance was tilted by what people associated with it. Taking advantage of this, the No 
campaign focused the debate not on a pragmatic analysis of the actual changes foreseen, 
but on what the constitution, and the EU generally, stood for. This forced the Yes camp 
onto the defensive. Often they could do nothing but protest against the discursive 
linkages, images, and storylines advanced by the No-side, arguing that this or that had 
‘nothing to do’ with the constitution (for example, F 15 April 2005). 
Associations with the EU or the EU constitution were widely structured around 
a number of fundamental discursive oppositions. This applied to the discourses of both 
the No and the Yes camps. The analyses that follow focus on two such clusters of 
oppositions. The ﬁrst, between a ‘liberal Europe’ and a ‘social Europe’, was the most 
important. It rested on a number of related discursive patterns regarding to the 
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relationship between impersonal market forces, globalisation, and European supra- 
nationalism, on one side, and human political agency or viable social policies, on the 
other. The second cluster of structuring binaries to be discussed subsequently contrasted 
a democratic Europe to a Europe where decisions are taken beyond the reach and 
control of the people. All these oppositions would align with the respec- tive positive 
ideals of the Europe supported versus negative counterimages of the Europe rejected. In 
the case of the No campaign, the rejected type often coincided with the EU either as it 
had developed historically or as the constitution would institute it. In the case of the 
Yes, the argument was that the constitution would help to bring the EU closer to the 
desired ideal and cut back on the undesirable aspects, or else that it had nothing to do 
with the respective bugbear. 
The social-liberal divide 
The emblem of ‘social Europe’ pervaded pro- and anti-constitution discourses 
alike. Constitution opponents on both the left and the right presented the treaty and the 
EU in its current form as threatening the social and economic situation in France and 
Europe, whereas a strong No-vote would make a more ‘social’ France as well as Europe 
possible (for example, L 23 March 2005a, see Duhamel, 2005, p. 14). The Socialist 
Yes-campaign canvassed that ‘the Yes’ was ‘the way to social Europe’ (Duhamel, 2005, 
p. 32, Atikcan, forthcoming, p. 102). Even President Chirac, who at ﬁrst primarily used 
the foundational legitimating argument that the EU/constitution stood for peace in 
Europe (see Sternberg, 2013; Atikcan, forthcoming, p. 102), eventually chose to justify 
the treaty in terms of social policy: that it was ‘a decisive step towards a more social 
situation’, and would allow ‘safeguarding the European social model’ (M 7 April 2005, 
28 May 2005). 
What exactly constituted social Europe remained hazy. Depending on political 
orientations and personal concerns, it often took shape ex negativo in terms of what the 
constitution supposedly threatened. Thus it could evoke the French ‘social acquis’, 
social protection, reduced unemployment, higher spending in public education, secure 
pensions, affordable sick insurance, efﬁcient public utilities and so on (see for example, 
M 24 May 2005b). A German journalist commented that the phrase mostly mirrored the 
respective speaker’s ideal of an ideal-world French welfare state as it had not been 
working for decades (Die Zeit 9 June 2005c). Longstanding vociferous resistance to 
threats, or changes, to the French social and economic model, had prepared the 
immediate availability and strong emotional appeal of references to ‘social Europe’. 
This conﬂict had culminated in a series of public sector strikes and street 
demonstrations against cuts to social spending and pensions, privatisation, and social 
security reforms from 1995 onwards (see Smith, 2004, p. viii, 2; see Atikcan, 
forthcoming, p. 94). 
Most decisively, social Europe was deﬁned against ‘liberalism’ (neo-liberalism, 
ultraliberalism). Liberalism, in turn, would be associated with the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ 
economic and social models, with unemployment, and the unchecked reign of market 
rationales and the forces of globalisation. Anti-liberal and anti-globalisation discourses 
had likewise been gaining ground since the mid-1990s (see Hay and Rosamond, 2002; 
Schmidt, 2002, 2007; Crespy, 2010). In the long run-up to the 2002 presidential 
election, both President Chirac and cohabitation Prime Minister Lionel Jospin had 
wooed the emerging anti-globalisation movement, responding to supposedly ‘clear 
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popular resonance’ of ‘anti-American, anti-imperialist’ and anti- liberal sentiments (Hay 
and Rosamond, 2002, p. 153). Regarding the question of how this connected to 
European integration, successive governments justiﬁed the cut- backs of the 1990s as 
necessary to help France meet the convergence criteria for monetary union. European 
economic integration, in turn, had been framed as protecting France against 
globalisation, in ofﬁcial discourse under Mitterrand as well as Chirac. In this discourse, 
Europe was France’s ‘shield’ against globalisation and its neo-liberal imperatives, as 
well as a means of rescuing the French welfare state. This narrative (Schmidt, 2002, p. 
187; 2007) had already suffered with the economic crisis of the 1990s (Sternberg, 2013, 
pp. 106–113), and did so even more now. It is noteworthy that in the ‘strikes against 
globalization’ of 1995, wider public discourse, unlike the government, did not generally 
blame France’s economic problems on   the EU, but rather on globalisation (Hay and 
Rosamond, 2002, p. 154). This changed now. 
The 2005 referendum debate marked the ‘coming of age’ (Crespy, 2008) of anti- 
globalisation discourses, and of the ‘idea that Europeanization and globalization were 
iterations of the same economic processes’ (Berezin, 2009, p. 207). Now Europe was 
ﬁrmly articulated with globalisation, and the ‘liberalism’ associated with it. European 
integration now seemed to generate, rather than help to solve, economic problems. In 
this transformed discursive landscape, Chirac’s defending the constitution as the way to 
‘social Europe’ proved ‘ultimately unconvincing’, for by now ‘voters believed [that this 
narrative] was contradicted by current EU policy priorities’ (Glencross, 2009). 
Again, it is striking that both opponents and proponents of the treaty used the 
social-Europe-versus-liberalism antithesis. Opponents linked the constitution to the 
bugbear of liberalism with all its associations: ‘There is no leftist Yes, and no Gaullist 
Yes. All there is is a liberal Yes. Full stop’ (Jean-Pierre Chevènement, nationalist- 
republican, former Socialist, M 7 April 2005). A common metaphor for the constitution 
was that of a ‘liberal corset’ or ‘liberal straitjacket’ (for example, M 20 April 2005a, 28 
May 2005, see 20 April 2005b). The pro-constitution side, on the other hand, called the 
constitution a ‘bulwark against ultraliberalism’ (for example, Socialist Jack Lang, M 28 
May 2005), echoing the ‘Mitterrandist’ discourse of Europe as a shield against 
globalisation (Schmidt, 2007). Chirac, again, followed the wider public debate’s, and 
ultimately the No camp’s, lead in joining the anti-liberal rhetoric: ‘Liberalism will end 
in disaster just like Communism’ (FAZ 28 May 2005a; see M 28 May 2005, L 24 May 
2005a) – to then brandish the treaty as Europe’s weapon for resisting ‘the globalisation 
carried by an ultraliberal current’ (in a televised discussion, M 16 April 2005). Thus 
accredited the spectre of a ‘liberal Europe’ that ‘attacked French social advantages’, 
some commentators observed, only ‘played into the hands of the partisans of the No’ 
(M 24 May 2005a). The discursive situation turned into such deadlock that ‘any 
mention of the word liberalism’ triggered off a ‘reaction against the constitution’ 
(Duhamel, 2005). 
Underpinning the equation of Europe/the constitution with ‘liberalism’ was their 
concurrent association with unemployment – another issue of immediate emotional 
appeal. The relocation of French jobs abroad (délocalisations) was an overpowering 
topic in the audiovisual media. In March in particular, ‘no day’ passed ‘without a 
relocation announcement’ (Cambadélis, 2005, p. 33; see Le Gall, 2005, p. 106). The 
issue’s extraordinary centrality during the referendum campaign has been compared 
with that of ‘insecurity’ in the 2002 presidential elections (for example, M 26 May 
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2005a; Cambadélis, 2005, p. 33). Campaigners for the No actively linked the 
constitution and délocalisations. Fabius for example had made his short-lived initial 
support of the treaty (withdrawn after only 3 days, when he came out as the leader of 
the Socialist No in September 2014) conditional upon the stipulation ‘everything for 
employment and against industrial relocation’ (M 29 May 2005). Henri Emmanueli, in 
his role as another central proponent of the Socialist No, undertook a ‘tour de France of 
the dislocated’ to 25 companies (M 26 May 2005a). Jacques Nikonoff, president of 
ATTAC France, warned: ‘if the yes wins on 29 May […] délocalisations will be 
accelerated’ (M 24 May 2005b). 
Fears of unemployment helped ratiﬁcation opponents to mobilise against the 
constitution an entrenched climate of insecurity, pessimism, smouldering frustration, 
which had forcefully manifested itself, and been stirred up, on the occasion of the 2002 
presidential election (see also Atikcan, forthcoming, p. 108).3 It centred on perceived 
threats to social welfare, employment, social protection, or retirement standards, or even 
the health system (see L 06/04, Le Gall, 2005, p. 106; Dehousse, 2006, p. 154; Ivaldi, 
2006; Berezin, 2009, pp. 126–166). This climate now found another focal point in the 
European services directive (see Crespy, 2010; Grossman and Woll, 2011). Referred to 
as the ‘Bolkestein directive’, it provided a powerful means of linking both EU and 
constitution not just with the outﬂow of jobs abroad, but also with the inﬂux of cheap  
labour  from  the  new  Eastern  member-states (for example, L 21 May 2005). In vain 
did treaty supporters repeat that the directive had ‘nothing to do with the constitution’ 
(L 16 March 2005). 
De Villiers popularised not only the orthographic mutilation ‘Bolkenstein’ 
(quipping ‘Bolkestein, Frankenstein, another million unemployed’, M 17 March 2005), 
but also the infamous symbol of the ‘Polish plumber’. The services directive, de Villiers 
alleged, entitled the skilled Pole to ‘offer his services in France, at the salary and with 
the rules of social protections of his country of origin. Out of the 11 million persons 
working in the services sector, one million jobs are threatened by this directive’ (F 15 
March 2005; for an earlier appearance of the Polish plumber, see Charlie Hebdo 
12/2004). De Villiers established the plumber as shorthand for the ‘dismantlement of 
our economic and social model’, for the destruction of French jobs as well as salary and 
protection standards. These associations created a discursive atmosphere where pro- and 
anti-campaigners alike competed over ‘who was the most hostile to the Bolkestein 
directive’ (L 24 May 2005a; see for example, Fabius in F 7 March 2005). Even the 
Chirac government distanced itself from the directive, which it had negotiated itself (see 
for example, M 29 May 2005). 
Another foundation stone of the social-Europe-versus-crude-liberalism opposi- 
tion’s was the antagonism of ‘the market’ and ‘the social’, which characterised 
discourses not only of the left. Unlike New Labour or the German tradition of the 
‘social market economy’, sociologist Alain Touraine noted, the French left had   long 
since tended to present market and welfare state as  two  antipodal,  rather  than 
potentially mutually reinforcing, forces. The call for the state to regulate and intervene 
in the market in order to guarantee social security and secure jobs had traditionally been 
louder in France than elsewhere in Europe (Süddeutsche Zeitung [SZ] 19 May 2005; see 
Hay and Rosamond, 2002; Dehousse, 2006, p. 155). Early pro-integration discourses 
had sought to have this active function of the state partly transferred, in people’s minds, 
to the European Communities in their foundational decades (Sternberg, 2013, pp. 44–
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54). In 2005, however, both France (among other member-states) and the EU had had 
difﬁculties in delivering these functions for many years. 
A frame had become rooted in the French public imaginary that blamed the EU 
for forcing France into a world where ‘the economy’ prevailed over the interest for ‘the 
common good’. ‘The market’ prevailed over ‘the social’, and the two were mutually 
exclusive. Some leftist as well as sovereignist opponents to the constitution nurtured 
hopes that France or the member-states could master the liberal market forces, if only 
the EU did not interfere (Touraine, Süddeutsche Zeitung 19 May 2005). They blamed 
the treaty for shifting the EU’s system towards ‘the market’ at the expense of the French 
and European social systems. This criticism bundled against the provision that 
competition in the internal market was ‘free and unobstructed’ (Article I:3–2). Although 
the principle had been ﬁxed in the Treaty of Rome since 1957 (Article 3), the far left 
and altermondialistes saw in this article a further step in the ‘organised submission’ to 
the ‘forces of the market’ (M 24 May 2005, see Heine, 2009). Across the political 
spectrum, many criticised that this ‘economic principle’ was being ‘erected as a 
constitutional principle for the organisation of society’ (L 23 March 2005a). Pro-
constitutionalists objected that according to another article (I-3) competition was not an 
‘objective in itself’ but only a means to the objectives of full employment and social 
progress (for example, L 25 March 2005; Sarkozy in F 14 April 2005). But anti-
constitutionalists made a meal of the treaty’s ‘restrictive third part’ deﬁning ‘an 
economic and social policy and II (Buffet in M 20 April 2005b). Even some supporters 
of the ‘Oui’ criticised the treaty for leaving social policy to the member-states, not 
enabling the EU to interfere enough (for example, M 24 May 2005a): ‘competitiveness’ 
continued to take precedent over ‘solidarity’, and ‘social and ﬁscal dumping’ remained 
possible (M 26 May 2005d). The association of the EU with liberalism rested further 
also on the understanding that convergence criteria and the European Central Bank 
‘prevent[ed] ﬁghting unemployment with contra-cyclical strategies’ (for example, M 26 
May 2005d). Together with the principle of ‘unobstructed competition’, this made 
‘Euro-Keynesianism’ impossible (M 28 May 2005). 
Nicolas Sarkozy, at the time minister of the interior, set out to undermine the 
market-social antagonism (although, he also reproduced it in statements like ‘the new 
Europe will be no longer at the service of the market’). In his discourse, which 
anticipated his presidential campaign, globalised market forces were essential to making 
social policies possible, namely  by  forcing  France  to  be  competitive. He ridiculed 
the eagerness of many constitutional sceptics to preserve the French social model, when 
this model was failing. ‘The best social model is that which gives everyone a job. 
Hence, it is not ours’ (M 14 May 2005a). 
In the liberal-versus-social frame, the ‘impersonal forces of the market’ and 
globalisation were up against a more ‘human’ world (see for example, Nikonoff in M 
24 May 2005b). Once again, globalisation was a lynchpin in how the EU was 
represented in the French constitutional debate. And once again many opponents 
depicted EU as an agent, a precursor, or ampliﬁer of the ‘inhuman’ forces of 
globalisation. The utopia of ‘social Europe’ by contrast stood for the ‘mastery’ of these 
forces, continuing on old ofﬁcial discourse. Presidential widow Danielle Mitterrand 
praised the No as a ‘forceful demonstration of our humanism’ (Spiegel 23 May 2005b). 
Counter to this, Yes-advocates framed the EU and the constitution pragmatically as 
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means of mastering globalisation and ‘putting the market at the service of the human 
being’ (Sarkozy, F 15 April 2005). They renewed the old but now increasingly 
endangered discourse of the EU as a guard or ‘bulwark’ against globalisation (for 
example, L 24 May 2005b). In any case, they pointed out, a rejection of the constitution 
would not stop globalisation. Quite the reverse, it would unleash its forces, giving away 
indispensable means of regulating them (F 14 April 2005, L 9 March 2005). 
The long-standing image of European integration as a resource for mastering 
globalisation was again used ﬂexibly for competing political orientations. In the 
language of the orthodox left, the constitution would provide ‘some useful means’ to 
check ‘neoliberalism’; for instance the fundamental rights charter offered European 
employees an ‘effective tool for toning down [salary] inequalities’ (L 25 May 2005). On 
the centre- right, and in Sarkozy’s language, the constitution featured as a ‘reform 
accelerator’ for the French system, which was in dire need of increasing its global 
competitiveness (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 25 May 2005, see F 14 April 2005). 
(Of course, many on the left would call precisely the reforms Sarkozy had in mind 
‘neoliberal’.) 
The discourse of the EU as a reform enabler went against the grain of another 
entrenched assumption in French Euro-sceptic discourses, which opposed ‘l’Europe’ to 
political voluntarism. This had already been a pillar of French EU-critical discourses at 
the time of the debate over the Maastricht treaty in the early 1990s (Sternberg, 2013, pp. 
143–148). At the time, opponents had set up the EU as the ‘reign of economic rationales 
and technocracy as opposed to “the political”, as in the effective ability to change things 
in accordance with political will’ (Sternberg, 2013, 
p. 121). Taking up this tradition, political agency, or ‘the political’, was now 
frequently opposed to constraints of the market or globalisation. This pattern pervaded 
leftist and rightist, anti- and pro-constitution discourses. The difference was that 
ratiﬁcation supporters understood that the constitution, and European integration 
generally, could help the member-states to recover lost capacity of action (for example, 
L 26 May 2005). The opponents on the contrary understood that they would exacerbate 
the lack-of-leeway-for-political-agency problem. Leftist discourses deﬁned ‘liberal 
Europe’ as the antithesis to ‘the political’ and ‘political responsi- bility’ (Nikonoff, L 23 
March 2005a). Rejecting a world in which the market ruled gave No-supporters the 
‘feeling that  they  were  the  agents  of  their  own  fate’.  To many, it meant that 
‘France, the political country par excellence’, refused the ‘primacy of economics’ over 
politics (Cambadélis, 2005, p. 35, 28). The droite sociale [social right] of Philippe 
Seguin agreed that ‘social Europe’ would mean recouping political agency and the 
ability to shape the world according to one’s will, and that the constitution obstructed 
this. 
Brief, the discourse that political voluntarism and political agency were at odds 
with European integration had become a force to be reckoned with. No-discourses on 
the right in particular reserved this capacity of wilful action on the world for the nation- 
state. To de Villiers, Le Pen, or Dupont-Aignan, a No-vote meant refusing the primacy 
of European supranationalism over politics. In contrast, many opponents on the left did 
not frame political voluntarism as inherently antagonistic to a supranational political 
framework, or to Europe. Some saw, as already quoted, the constitution’s principal 
shortcoming in that it did not go far enough in creating supranational frameworks for 
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political voluntarism. In this voluntarism-through-supranationalism sub-discourse, 
rejecting the constitution was still an act of reclaiming political agency over economics, 
but precisely by demanding a more  rather  than  less  supranationalist  arrangement. Of 
course, concurrent reﬂexes against supranationalism, at least by implication, were 
notable among many constitutional opponents of the left. 
Democracy? 
In addition to being shorthand for political voluntarism and agency on the world, 
‘the political’ was increasingly also used in the sense of political contestation.  It was  
becoming  a  counter-ideal  to  de-politicised  (for  example,  technocratic, bureaucratic, 
constitutionalist) modes of governance, political will-formation, and ‘integration from 
above’ (see also Glencross, 2009). References to ‘the political’ in this sense conjured up 
a picture of politics, at the heart of which lay conﬂict. In this picture conﬂict was not 
something to be avoided or else resolved as quickly as possible, but something 
appreciated. It framed politics as the very processes of negotiating clashing interests, 
worldviews, values and so on. In the anti-constitu- tionalist line of argument, the ‘ 
“constitutionalisation” of economic policy’ was a problem in that it moved essentially 
political questions out of the realm of public contestation (for example, Nikonoff in L 
23 March 2005a). Pro-constitutionalists replied that the constitution, by making EU 
decision making more transparent, would, quite the contrary, precisely move it to the 
realm of public scrutiny, opinion- formation, and contestation (for example, L 26 May 
2005). Both arguments effectively rooted the idea that political contestation is a 
condition of democratic legitimacy in the public repertoire of discourses on what makes 
a state or a post- national unit composed of states legitimate. 
This emphasis on contestation as part of democratic life was only one aspect of 
an emerging discourse on democracy in the EU and its deﬁciencies, which took a  ﬁrm 
hold of the public imaginary during the French debate on the EU constitution. To be 
sure, part of the debate was directed (in line with traditional understandings of 
democracy) at the treaty’s institutional or  constitutional  reforms  and  the  extent to 
which they would make EU decision making more democratic. The pro- 
constitutionalist mantra was that they did (for example, L 22 November 2004, F 18 May 
2005, 5 May 2005, 11 March 2005, 25 March 2005; Maatsch, 2007, p. 276; see 
Atikcan, forthcoming, pp. 101–105). The opposing side admonished that these advances 
did not go far enough: the European Parliament still had no legislative initiative; the 
citizen’s initiative was useless because not binding upon the Commis- sion; the 
Commission would still be neither sufﬁciently accountable nor authorised (M 28 May 
2005, 21 April 2005, 23 March 2005a, 12 October 2004, F 12 April 2005). Another 
common criticism brandished the treaty’s revision procedure as ‘clearly obstructive’ (L 
12 October 2004, see M 28 May 2005). This was encapsulated in the pervasive image of 
the constitution – and its political and economic biases – being ‘set in stone’ (see 23 
March 2005a). Some critics furthermore fell back on the longstanding critiques of the 
EU as non-transparent, elitist, and undemocratic in this (M 28 May 2005) but this 
discourse was had less clout than in the debate around the 1992 Maastricht referendum 
still. 
The real battle over the EU’s ‘democratic deﬁcit’ in the French debate on the EU 
constitution, however, was not fought in these skirmishes about the treaty’s (supposed) 
democracy-enhancing provisions. It was not fought over the EU’s institutional setup 
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and day-to-day decision-making procedures or practices. The phrase ‘democratic 
deﬁcit’, if employed at all, tended to be used in more inclusive, interpretable senses. 
Some used it directly to denote the perceived lack of political agency discussed above 
(for example, L 12 October 2004). Some used it as a signiﬁer for the EU’s weak 
performance of whatever would have been ‘good for the people’ from the respective 
standpoint (for example, F 2 March 2005). Furthermore, the term was employed for the 
indifference of many citizens to EU politics, expressed in low participation in EP 
elections (for example, L 23 March 2005a). 
The most powerful critique, however, of EU democracy aimed at the 
disenfranch- isement of the European citizens in the construction of ‘l’Europe’ over the 
past ﬁve decades, and the ‘democratic deﬁcit’ became an emblem of it. ‘For the 
partisans of the No,’ Le Monde summarised, ‘Europe has been constructed outside of all 
rules of democracy, and the project of the constitution is a new piece of evidence for 
this. With the exception of the referendum on the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, the 
French, they say, have been kept well away from the European debate, to which only 
some initiated circles have access’ (M 28 May 2005, see also L 23 March 2005a). The 
Bolkestein directive, but also the 2004 enlargement and now the negotiations over 
Turkey joining the EU became embodiments of this disenfranchisement – of how 
decisions that would ‘deeply disrupt the life of the French’ and constitute a threat to 
French welfare, jobs, and salaries, would be ‘taken over their heads’. The services 
directive, many claimed (debatably, if the French government is constituted of elected 
representatives), had been passed ‘without their elected representatives being able to 
have their say’. An omnipresent reproach was that the French were ‘never consulted’ 
about Eastern enlargement (all M 30 March 2005). Against this backdrop, a No-vote 
emerged as a unique opportunity for people to throw a spanner into the works of a 
process that had been unrolling over their heads. 
Chirac had tried to disengage the question of Turkish accession from the 
constitution by promising a separate referendum on it (M 29 May 2005). This attempt 
failed. Le Pen’s call to vote No was framed as a call to say ‘No to Turkey’s entry to the 
Union’ (M 2 March 2005a). He thus appealed to xenophobic sentiments without even 
having to pronounce them explicitly on all occasions (Berezin, 2009). Dupont-Aignan 
canvassed for a rejection of the referendum on the grounds that ‘the treaty opens 
Europe’s door to Turkey’ (M 28 May 2005, see F 7 April 2005). De Villiers, too, 
declared refusal of Turkish accession ‘one of the principal motivations’ of the no’. The 
‘obvious’ link he asserted between Turkey and the Constitution was an indirect one: ‘If 
the yes wins, the process [of accession] will be irreversible whereas if the no wins 
negotiations will immediately be suspended’ (F 14 March 2005). Anti-constitutionalists 
reasoned that rejecting the constitution was a ‘means of preventing Turkey’s accession’, 
of defying the ‘trap’ of commenced negotiations leading ‘ineluctably’ to Turkey’s 
admission (M 5 March 2005). In vain did the partisans of the Yes insist that the 
constitution provided means of stopping Turkish accession – thus only accepting the 
rhetoric that Turkish membership was something to be prevented. On the whole, ant-
constitutionalists, especially but not exclusively the ‘non de droite’, imposed an 
essentialist discourse on the debate as a whole, includ- ing many constitutionalists (if 
they did not already have it), along the lines of Turkish traditions   being   ‘incompatible   
with   Europe’s   values’  (Chirac,   M16  April 2005). No-campaigners could draw on 
xenophobic feelings as well as fears of ‘social dumping’ and ‘stolen jobs’ (see for 
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example, L 23 March 2005b, François Hollande/ PS in 12 April 2005, M 5 March 2005, 
M 24 May 2005b, L 23 March 2005b; Le Gall, 2005, p. 106; see for example, 
Dehousse, 2006, p. 154). 
Many compared Turkish accession with the 2004 enlargement. Like the latter, 
enlargement towards Turkey would be a precipitous ‘fuite en avant’, a deﬁance of 
political, cultural, and economic facts, some anti-constitutionalists of both left and right 
argued (Dupont-Aignan in F 7 April 2005; see equally Fabius in F 7 March 2005). The 
Eastern enlargement in particular still incited similar fears and reactions to the Turkish 
question. The No to the constitution (and opposition to Turkey’s entry into the EU) 
emerged as an ex-post protest to Eastern enlargement. The referendum became the 
people’s fervently longed-for opportunity to  express their  objection  (M 5 March 2005) 
– not only to enlargement, Turkish accession, or the social and economic model 
associated with the EU, but also, more broadly, to not having more of a say in the 
political will-formation and decision making in the EU. 
This symbolic act of obstruction could effectively force Europe’s political 
leaders to act in consideration of their peoples’ misgivings. In this sense, much of the 
discourses around enlargement, Bolkestein, and Turkey in effect contributed to spinning 
a potent narrative of the referendum (vote and debate) as a violent assertion by the 
people of their sovereignty: their right, and will, to inﬂuence decisions about the future 
political, social, and economic makeup of Europe, and France. Moreover, by virtue of 
all these emblems’ discursive association with unemployment, unchecked market 
forces, and threats to the French social model, the discourse of the assertion of popular 
sovereignty linked up with the above discourse of the No as a way of re-claiming 
political agency in a globalising world. 
 
Conclusions 
 
 
This article has presented an interpretive-explorative, non-quantitative reading 
of the French debate about the EU constitution as reﬂected in the press. It has focused 
on two clusters of discourses: (i) the structuring antagonism of ‘social Europe’ and 
‘liberal Europe’ and its discursive underpinnings, as well as (ii) a new discourse on 
what democracy or the lack thereof meant in the context of the EU, centred on 
reclaiming political agency as well as popular sovereignty in inﬂuencing the future of 
Europe. Although, this desire was expressed in a French, national referendum and 
debate, a noteworthy shift was that this outcry for agency and popular sovereignty 
seemed no longer principally limited to the conﬁnes of the nation. In principle at least it 
could extend to the EU as a whole. Moreover, both the binary structure of the ﬁrst 
cluster and the shift in how democracy was understood pervaded both pro- and anti- 
constitutional discourses, the difference being how they related the constitution and its 
ratiﬁcation to them. Another feature that united both pro- and anti-ratiﬁcation discourses 
was that they did not usually reject European integration as such, but claimed to be 
searching for a ‘better Europe’. This corresponds to ﬁndings in behaviouralist accounts 
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that the French ‘no votes were a signal of voters wanting not less Europe but rather a 
different Europe’ (Hobolt and Brouard, 2011, p. 309). 
How does this reading of the French debate ﬁt in with existing accounts of the 
French debate on the EU constitution? Its interpretation of the social-versus-liberal 
antagonism and its discursive foundations was an attempt to ﬁll in a lacuna innate to 
most accounts that identify social and economic issues as a ‘key factor’ shaping both 
the debate and voting decisions. The article has sought to contribute an exploration of 
what the discourses behind, and embedding, these codes or survey items may have 
meant to people, and how such meanings were made and how they related to underlying 
webs of meanings, beliefs, and traditions. 
For example, the article’s analysis of the new dominant discourse on what was 
at fault with democracy in the EU illustrates that even statements that might be 
registered (at least on one level) as statements about enlargement, a speciﬁc directive, or 
Turkish accession in effect carried a rich narrative about democracy and a reclaiming of 
political agency and popular sovereignty. In addition, the article has revisited the 
common analysis that overall the No camp had the upper hand in deﬁning the terms and 
grounds of debate, and effectively forced ratiﬁcation advocates into the defensive. One 
way to substantiate this hypothesis is through the high salience of issues that ‘shed a 
bad light on the constitution’ (Maatsch, 2007, p. 276). This article has added perspective 
to this picture by analysing some speciﬁc structural patterns and dynamics that anti-
constitu- tionalists managed to impose on the debate: how they redeﬁned the question at 
stake, how they worked with general associations with the EU and the treaty, how they 
tied the constitution to the liberal-social divide and poled entrenched anti-liberal 
sentiments as working against the constitution and so on. 
At the level of methodological questions and their implications, interpretive 
explorations into discursive meaning-making of the kind offered in this article may be 
informative with a view to selecting textual codes in content analysis, identifying 
factors to be weighed in explanatory factor analysis, or designing surveys or 
experiments. Two examples illustrate this point, while also referring back to the 
remaining questions set out above. 
First, the numerical evidence from content analyses of the French debate’s 
media coverage is contradictory regarding the saliency of the issue of ‘democracy’. The 
difference seems to be because of choices of code selection and deﬁnition, in particular 
whether ‘democracy’ is included at all as a category, and how inclusively or narrowly it, 
and rival compared categories, are deﬁned. Qualitative work can, and does, inform such 
choices. In addressing the question whether democracy really was absent from the 
debate or whether it rather entered it in disguise, this article has argued that there is a 
democracy-related story, and a central one, to be told about this referendum debate. 
Second, the identiﬁed discourse deﬁning a No-vote as a constructive act of hope 
and building a better Europe points to ways of building on the experiment setup  by 
issue depend on how it is portrayed’). Her independent variable is whether the negative 
consequences of ratiﬁcation versus non-ratiﬁcation were highlighted to respondents 
(2009, p. 20, 110–133). This takes up the broader understanding in   the political-
framing literature mentioned above, whereby ‘frames that contain negative information 
are more successful in affecting individuals’ opinions’ than more positive ones 
(Atikcan, forthcoming, p. 5, see her discussion and literature review on 12–13). The 
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debate as it was presented in this paper, however, was very much about positive ideals 
and utopias, about people wanting to make their voices and wills carry in deciding about 
the future of the country and of Europe. Framing the No-vote as a positive act of hope 
may well have been the most decisive framing move of the No campaign. But then, of 
course, hopes may be considered the ﬂipside of fears, and testing their respective effects 
in an experiment situation might shed some interesting light on this underlying 
philosophical question. 
With a view to a couple of additional, larger questions occupying EU studies, to 
conclude, the article’s interpretations support, from a different angle, the ﬁnding in 
research on public attitudes and the structure of political contestation that the classic 
line of supranationalism-versus-national-sovereignty (‘more’ versus ‘less Europe’) has 
gradually been replaced or complemented by a new dividing line that articulated 
conﬂict over Europe more closely with the classic left-right axis of contestation over 
policy issues, including social and economic issues (see Hooghe et al, 2002; Ivaldi, 
2006, p. 66, Hobolt, 2009, p. 277). 
Moreover, the described assertion of the will to take agency over political, 
social, and economic decisions shores up calls for more politicisation and 
institutionalised political contestation, including about substantial policy choices in 
European politics (see for example, Føllesdal and Hix, 2006; White, 2010; de Wilde, 
2011). It supports it not in terms of greater normative legitimacy, but in terms of what 
public discourses demanded on the occasion of one of the most intense, polarised, and 
inclusive debates on the European integration ever. Once again, there may of course be 
a gap between what media discourses demanded and actual citizen attitudes. Indeed, 
three recent qualitative (or mixed method) studies, which draw centrally on focus group 
discussions (Duchesne et al, 2013; Van Ingelgom, 2014) or on a comparative qualitative 
survey built around a range of open-ended questions (Gaxie et al, 2011), have described 
the attitudes of ‘ordinary citizens’ towards Europe as marked not only by ambuiguity, 
but importantly also by indifference. People, these studies suggest, do not care about the 
EU. But they do care about issues such as globalisation, economic ﬂows, and their 
consequences for democracy and the welfare state. 
This reading of the French debate on the constitutional treaty presented in this 
paper suggests not only that contestation over Europe did happen on this occasion. It 
also offers an interpretation of how it happened where it did; namely through 
contestation over these very issues, including France’s and Europe’s social and 
econonic  future  makeup,  and  popular  sovereignty.  This  debate  transformed the 
landscape of what it makes sense to say about Europe. Glossing over those points of 
controversy is very deﬁnitely no longer a plaubible discursive option – if it ever was 
even before the deabate (see Sternberg, 2013, pp. 2010–2022 on longer-term and 
broader discursive shifts to this effect). In conjunction with the referendum result, the 
French debate shows: politicisation on the ground is happening, with or without 
encouragement. And with the ongoing public debates across Europe on the Eurozone 
crisis, much more of it was yet to come. Today the discursive link between the EU or 
the Euro and social and economic issues is stronger than ever, and the idea that whoever 
cares about them should care about the EU is gaining ground. 
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Notes 
1 The left-wing No campaign was ‘highly united’ and organised, 
with the ‘No committee’ assembling approximately local 900–
1000 committees all over France and achieving ‘astonishing local 
implantation’. The Yes camp, by contrast, was much less 
coordinated and less implanted (Atikcan, forthcoming, pp. 99–100, 
103, 115). 
2 Indeed, Gamson offers empirical evidence for a gap between these 
guiding media frames and how participants in focus groups discuss 
political issues. On how people ‘use information available from 
media and societal discourse selectively and creatively for their 
own purposes’, see Baden/de Vreese, 2008, p. 118. For two studies 
of popular media reception speciﬁcally in the French context, 
which likewise idenyify a gap between media discourses and citizen 
beliefs and opinions, see Goulet, 2010 and Le Grignou, 2003. 
3 Atikcan (forthcoming) quotes an UMP communications ofﬁcial as 
reﬂecting on the referendum campaign with hindsight, that the Yes 
campaign’s mistake had been to misjudge the ‘national political 
spirit’ at the time, which was fundamentally ‘pessimistic’, whereas 
the No campaign found better ways to talk to people, appealing to 
their profound fears (p. 108). 
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